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Introduction
The presence of China in the immediate neighbourhood of the South-
east Asian region has always been a crucial factor in the policy-making of 
states there. Even the process of regional integration, although successful 
in its aim to diminish the unwanted influence of neighbouring countries, 
did not manage to exclude it completely. Since its establishment in 1967, 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, also referred to as 
the Association within this article) had to adopt a strategy towards China, 
which varied within the space of years from hostility through alliance to 
partnership. The change of the international dynamic in the whole of East 
Asia that occurred after the end of the Cold War has increased the impor-
tance of the Chinese factor in Southeast Asia even more, yet the growing 
potential of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now one of the main 
features of the emerging new order. As a consequence of this rise it was 
believed that ASEAN would be forced to adopt one of two strategies: bal-
ancing the Chinese threat or bandwagoning with Beijing as the stronger 
ally (Roy 2005). Recently, however, the idea of hedging seems to be gaining 
popularity and the Southeast Asian countries are considered to be ‘hedg-
ers’ against the growing Chinese assertiveness (Lee 2012).
1 I  would like to express my thanks to Professor Małgorzata Pietrasiak, Mr. 
Viktor Eszterhai, and Mr. Jann Christoph von der Pütten for their valuable in-
sights and questions during the first presentation of this paper during 9th Lodz 
East Asian Meetings, June 6th 2013.
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This approach seems not to reflect the fact that, despite dynamic in-
tegration processes, ASEAN is not a unitary actor. While the multidimen-
sional diversity of its member countries is often emphasised as a negative 
factor in the  regional integration processes (Pimoljinda 2013), it seems 
to be neglected in regards to foreign relations, which tend to be treated 
as deeply coordinated among the member states and representing their 
interests in a  comparable degree on the  one hand, and deeply depend-
ant on the external pushes on the other (Hsiao and Yang 2008; Severino 
2009). This appears to be a simplification leading to the misinterpreta-
tion of the relations between ASEAN and the PRC as de facto bilateral 
ones, while in fact the ASEAN member countries adopt their own strate-
gies and attitudes towards the PRC. It is their independent expected goals 
and challenges associated with China that motivate their stances rather 
that any commonly agreed, ASEAN-wide strategy. These interests shape 
the Association’s policy, and not the other way round.
The purpose of this paper is to identify the main interests of the ASE-
AN countries that influence their approach to China, classify them into 
pull and push factors and determine their significance for particular mem-
ber states, which should allow to reflect the power play among the states 
and thus the prevailing interests as well. In this way the main pivots of 
the ASEAN policy towards China can be established and the main trends 
predicted. Then, using the proposed typology into push and pull factors, 
the example of the South China Sea, a push factor, will be analysed to 
show how the same issue can affect the policies of states differently, de-
pending on the power play of other factors.
Determining the Shaping Factors of Foreign Policy
Foreign policy can be perceived as a  spectrum of means, which 
a state can devise to champion its interests. Hence the national interests 
form the core of all foreign activities and as such should be considered 
the baseline of a foreign policy analysis (Jackson and Sørensen 2003, 100). 
The same rule should govern the study of more complex subjects, like 
ASEAN; in such cases, however, the identification of the main interests 
of the whole entity poses a greater challenge, since it requires prior exam-
ination of the potential benefits or losses of member countries, as well as 
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the internal hierarchy of the described grouping. The following chapter is 
an attempt to perform such an analysis on ASEAN and its member coun-
tries in their relation towards China.
Typology of interests: push factors versus pull 
factors
Traditionally, the national interests are divided by their subject area 
into politics, security, economics and a broad category of cultural and so-
cial relations. Acknowledging this typology it is generally assumed that, 
while following its interests of the first two categories, the governments 
are more likely to use the “zero-sum game” approach and pursue the pol-
icy of conflict rather than cooperation (Maersheimer 2001, 25–26). On 
the contrary, the economic interests are often perceived as a basis of any 
cooperation since they generate gains for all the participating countries 
(Waltz 2001, 99). The last category is often neglected as it is believed to 
haveonly a minor impact on the formation of foreign policy.
A  closer look at the  situation between China and ASEAN (and its 
member countries) shows, however, that these assumptions are oversim-
plified. Firstly, due to thegrowing engagement of China in Southeast Asia 
and the institutional network of the regional integration, conflict or coop-
eration are manifested more in the form of mitigating or inviting Chinese 
presence in the  integration framework than in their ‘traditional’ forms 
(though the latter are by no means excluded). Therefore it seems appro-
priate that the national interests should be perceived as well as factors 
which either encourage the ASEAN member countries to or discourage 
them from keeping China engaged in the region, that is, in various forms 
of the regional cooperation. For the purposes of this article the interests 
generating cooperative approach will be described as pull factors (since 
they are ‘pulling’ China into the  regional cooperation), while the  ones 
leading to conflict policies will be named push factors (‘pushing’ China 
out and moderating its presence in the  region). Secondly, the  assump-
tion that the  economic interests are by  their nature the  ‘pulling’ ones, 
while the political and security matters usually cause dissonances not al-
ways proves to be true in case of China – ASEAN relations. Push and pull 
factors are present among both groups and vary throughout the member 
states; the same action of the Beijing government can be appealing for one 
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state and appalling for another, depending on its own national interests. 
Table 1 illustrates this typology in form of a matrix, in which the chosen 
interests are divided into categories and presented in a hierarchical order 
within them.
Table 1. Typology of interests into push and pull factors
Push factors
Political and security interests
P
u
ll factors
Territorial disputes (SCS dispute)
Maritime security
China’s regional dominance
China – U.S.A rivalry
Cooperation in regional bodies
Common security interests and threats
Similar ideology and common identity
Military cooperation
Negative trade expectations
Competitive export
Growing vulnerability and dependence
Expected decrease of FDI
Positive trade expectations
Expected inflow of FDI
Developmental aid
Technology import
Economic interests
Source: own elaboration.
Interests of the member states: engaging 
or discouraging China
Taking political and security push factors as a  starting point it is 
clear that the territorial issues, and especially the dispute over islands in 
the South China Sea (SCS), have a great significance for the relations be-
tween the ASEAN member countries and China (Zhong 2010). Beijing’s 
activities in this area, considered aggressive, are perceived as an important 
security threat to many ASEAN countries, which is only deepened by their 
historical experiences of Chinese dominance. The level of threat percep-
tion depends, however, on the engagement of a given state into pursuing 
its claims, as well as on the actual sovereignty over the islands. Thus, for 
Vietnam and the Philippines the SCS dispute is a strong push factor and 
a prominent threat to national security. Whereas in Malaysia it is per-
ceived as a push factor since it generates regional tensions, while it does 
not seem to be of great importance for Brunei (Bangkok Post 2013). Due 
to the  lack of direct interest, the  so-called ‘continental’ ASEAN states, 
that is Thailand, Myanmar and Laos, this issue does not discourage them 
from closer relations with China. The territorial clashes can, however, be 
241 Hedging China? The Meaning of the ASEAN Member States’ Interests…
considered a push factor for Indonesia and Singapore as well; even though 
these two countries do not voice any claims to the disputed islands, they 
perceive the growing tension in the maritime area of Southeast Asia as 
a significant threat to their security.
Another reason for some ASEAN countries to limit Chinese presence 
in the region is the ambiguity of the long-term strategy of Beijing towards 
the  region. What the Southeast Asian states fear is the Chinese domi-
nance taking form of a regional hegemony. These states are interested in 
maintaining the balance of power in the region and keeping the United 
States involved (Hamilton-Hart 2012, 336–337). Thus, the disagreements 
between the U.S. and China, as well as the gradual power shift between 
these states, seem to form a push factor as well, especially for Vietnam, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and recently Myanmar.
The significance of the pull factors in the subject of politics and se-
curity should not, however, be overlooked. The rise of the new security 
challenges and threats, such as piracy, pandemics, environmental issues 
and natural catastrophes, common for China and the majority of the ASE-
AN member states, inspires the latter to engage Beijing even more closely 
into regional cooperation forums. Moreover, the participation of China 
in various regional bodies is a trust-building factor, as it serves for greater 
transparency Chinese policy and helps in managing crises and tensions. 
Thus, the Chinese presence in the regional bodies is a pulling factor for 
deepening the  already existing connections. What additionally helps to 
enhance the closeness between the ASEAN member countries and China 
is their shared identity as Asian states, appealing to similar values and 
ideologies.
Even though the  growing economic relations between ASEAN and 
China should be an important incentive for the ASEAN member coun-
tries to tighten their relations with Beijing, the fact is that the gains and 
costs of this development are not distributed equally. While some of 
the ASEAN countries, especially the richer and more prominent ones that 
include the likes of Singapore or Malaysia, have positive expectations and 
experiences from ASEAN, such as the China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), 
the  smaller ones, which include the  Philippines, Laos or Vietnam, are 
more likely to bear the burdens (Gradziuk 2010). Another important push 
factor is the question of competitive export; in Indonesia and Thailand 
specifically, producers of labour-intensive or unrefined goods voice their 
fears of cheap Chinese products flooding their national markets and their 
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external markets (Ginting 2011, Hukum Online 2010). This issue does 
not, however, have the quality of a push factor for these countries whose 
production is rather complementary to that of the PRC, such as Malay-
sia or Singapore (Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2009).
Tightening economic connections between China and the Associ-
ation have their effects on other spheres as well. Among the member 
countries contradictory expectations can be observed regarding the fu-
ture inflow of FDI, with some of them believing that China will attract 
potential investors and the  levels of the  capital located in Southeast 
Asian countries will decrease (Ravenhill 2006). Even though the gath-
ered data denies this assumption, proving that the FDI in China and 
the ASEAN member countries grow simultaneously, some countries ex-
press their fears of a deepening vulnerability to the status of the Chinese 
economy. They want to avoid greater economic dependence, in which 
they see a source of potential crisis and conflict, and thus limit the eco-
nomic presence of Beijing in the region (Ng 2007). On the other hand, 
the less developed countries, such as Myanmar or Cambodia, profit from 
the Chinese engagement in the Southeast Asia as beneficiaries of devel-
opmental aid from Beijing. Keeping China engaged in various regional 
developmental bodies is their vital interest, since thanks to the Chinese 
presence they receive significant help in, for example, infrastructure or 
technology development.
This short presentation of the choice of ASEAN member countries 
regarding their interests towards China exemplifies how complex in fact 
the Sino-ASEAN relations are. Each country has its own reasons to ei-
ther invite Beijing to join closer regional cooperation or to contain its in-
fluence in a given subject area. Thus, as a form of conclusion, a division 
can be drawn between the ASEAN member countries. While it would be 
best for the interests of Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines to mit-
igate the Chinese presence in Southeast Asia, Cambodia and Brunei are 
greatly interested in strengthening it. However, the situation is not so 
unambiguous for Singapore, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos, 
whose relation to China is more complicated, since the Chinese pres-
ence is beneficial for them in some aspects, however, disadvantageous 
on the other. Knowing their particular interests and their relative power 
within the Association, it can be analysed more accurately which poli-
cies the ASEAN member countries will adopt towards China and how it 
will affect the policy of ASEAN as a whole.
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Establishing the Foreign Policy of ASEAN Towards 
China
In the face of the rising regional power that China has recently be-
come, the  relatively small states forming ASEAN are believed to have 
three options: (1) bandwagoning, that is, cooperating closely for benefits 
from good relation with the regional power; (2) soft balancing by tighten-
ing relations with another significant power, the United States, in order to 
counterbalance the Chinese influences in the region; (3) hedging, which 
is the policy of avoiding a close alliance with one power at the expense of 
the other, or ‘keeping the equal distance’ from each of the powers pres-
ent in the  region (Kuik 2008). Khong (2004) argues that hedging, with 
elements of soft balancing, will be the  main course of ASEAN foreign 
policy towards China. However, it appears that recently the Association 
is shifting its stance more towards balancing. The analysis of the particu-
lar interests of the member states presented above helps to understand 
the reasons of this shift.
Picking the right policy: soft balancing, 
cooperating, and hedging
According to the recent analysis of Chen and Yang (2013), the three 
visions of foreign policy, bandwagoning, soft balancing and hedging, are 
present among the attitudes of ASEAN member countries towards China. 
They claim that the states enjoying both good economic and security re-
lations with Beijing follow the strategy of bandwagoning, while the states 
harbouring negative trade expectations and perceiving China as a threat 
for their security pursue the balancing policy. The remaining states, hav-
ing satisfactory relations in one sphere and disappointing in the other, 
hedge against the PRC. While the proposed model is useful in showing 
both the complexity of the Sino-ASEAN relations and their changeability 
in time, it does not reflect the internal hierarchy within the Association 
and hence does not allow to predicts which strategy prevails. Thus, while 
it can be agreed that the countries in which the push factors dominate 
over the pull ones are more prone to balance China than the countries in 
which push and pull factors have comparable impact (see Graph 1), in or-
der to determine the direction of the ASEAN common policy towards Bei-
jing it is necessary to establish the internal order within the organisation.
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Graph 1. Strategies of the ASEAN member states towards China according 
to their interests
Source: own elaboration, based on Chen and Yang 2013
According to the  foreign policy patterns presented in Graph no 1, 
the strategy chosen most frequently among the ASEAN member states is 
hedging, followed closely by soft balancing, which would confirm the the-
ses of Khong (2004) and Goh (2005, 2007). As mentioned in the previous 
section, the foreign policy choices result from the interests that are of vital 
importance to the member states, namely their territorial sovereignty and 
maritime security (compromised by Chinese claims to the SCS islands), 
uneven distribution of burdens and benefits of closer economic relations 
with China and the  fear of Chinese hegemony in the  region. Another 
factor which pulls China closer and is fulfilled in the form of hedging is 
Beijing’s engagement in the regional cooperation forums, which helps to 
moderate the Chinese influence and keep an equal distance to all powers 
participating in the  multilateral bodies. It should be closely examined, 
however, which member states pursue the interests affecting the policy of 
the Association to the greatest extent. Basing on the analysis from the pre-
vious section it can be determined that these interests are of importance 
mainly for the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and, 
to lesser extent, Thailand. Hence it can be assumed that any shifts in 
policy towards China will be resulting from a tug-of-war between these 
states, though the recent changes observed in Myanmar are not without 
their significance.
Building upon the  reasoning presented above, it could be assumed 
that hedging (with elements of soft balancing) can be expected to become 
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the  long-term strategy of ASEAN. However, the  recent events seem to 
show a  gradual growth of the  role of soft balancing, with the policy of 
hedging still present and important. This shift can be ascribed to sever-
al reasons, with the aggravation of the territorial dispute and tightening 
of Chinese stance in Southeast Asia being the most prominent among 
them. The next chapter elaborates on this change, using the examples of 
Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia to illustrate how the push factor of Chi-
nese assertiveness in the SCS dispute influences their attitudes towards 
Beijing.
One policy, different executions: Indonesia, 
Vietnam, Malaysia
Indonesia
The gradual change from hedging to soft balancing results to a great 
extent from the changing interests of Jakarta and its regained influence 
on the whole Association. Promoting the regional stability and autono-
my from any non-ASEAN superpowers has always been among the most 
vital interests of Indonesia; not only national, but more regional as well, 
considering its aspiration to be in the  leading role of ASEAN. That is 
why the growing assertiveness of China in the region, especially Beijing’s 
plans to ensure its dominance over virtually the whole SCS, would upset 
the balance of power ensuring the stability in Southeast Asia, contribute 
to the shift in the Indonesian foreign policy (Murphy 2013).
While Indonesia does not officially advocate the  policy of contain-
ing Chinese engagement and interests in the Southeast Asia, its recent 
rapprochement with the United States seems to be on contrary to these 
declarations. Although it could be argued that the Sino-Indonesian ties 
are dynamically developing as well, they still seem to be of pragmatic 
rather than strategic nature. It seems that Jakarta is still missing a long-
term strategy towards China, as if the Indonesian government was still 
unsure what role China should play in the region (Tjhin 2012). The Unit-
ed States on the other hand, always perceived as a  stabilising factor in 
the regional policy, seems to have an important place in Indonesian long-
term policy. The development of their mutual relations started to progress 
dynamically in 2008, when the agreement on strategic partnership was 
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signed; since then, the United States and Indonesia has been strengthen-
ing their ties in all areas, through both the multilateral bodies and bilater-
al relations. The U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the President 
Barack Obama visited Jakarta in 2009 and 2010 respectively; in 2011 
Barack Obama was also the first U.S. President to attend the 19th East 
Asian Summit, which took place on Bali (Bush 2011). The special spot in 
the U.S.-Indonesian relations are the security issues as the two countries 
enjoy a tightening military cooperation, mostly in the forms of a growing 
defence trade, common training operations and financial funds received 
from Washington. The most prominent example of the arms trade might 
be the contract for Boeing aircraft (attack helicopters) worth 21.7 billion 
USD, signed in November 2011; it is worth mentioning that this was 
the largest commercial contract ever signed by the Boeing company (Babb 
2011). The military ties are strengthened not only by occasional events, 
like the  joint Counterterrorism Exercise in September 2013 in Sentul, 
West Java (Siboro 2013), but also by  the  regular meetings of the  Joint 
Commission, which is responsible, among others, for information ex-
change and the sharing of good practices for organizing the defence sector 
(Hiebert, Osius, and Poling 2013). Thus, the United States has emerged 
as a vital partner who helps to enhance the role of Indonesia within ASE-
AN (Hiebert and Magpile 2012).
Such close relations with the United States, in light of the perception 
of the U.S.A. as the sole superpower and thus the only state able to bal-
ance the influence of Beijing in Southeast Asia, evokes the all too known 
anti-Chinese connotations. While some believe that a developing regional 
power such as Indonesia cannot allow itself to choose a security alliance 
with the United States over the economic gains from growing trade with 
China (Bodirsky 2012), the compromised security interests of Indonesia 
in the SCS, combined with the competitive characters of Indonesian and 
Chinese exports, seem to counter this thesis. Thus it appears that while 
Jakarta is still willing to maintain its positive relations to Beijing and 
keep it engaged, mostly via multilateral forums, its rapprochement with 
the United States bears marks of balancing China rather than hedging it. 
It is worth noting, however, that the Chinese leaders are actively counter-
ing the rapprochement between the U.S. and Indonesia. A vivid example 
of that was the quick reaction to the news of Barack Obama cancelling his 
Barack Obama visit to the ASEAN countries in October 2013. Chinese 
President Xi Jinping, during his visit in October 2013, offered a strength-
ening of trade relations with Indonesia and signalised his determination 
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to enhance cooperation with the Southeast Asian countries. Even though 
Indonesia is still wary of Chinese ambitions, the  cancelled visit casted 
doubts on the true intentions and commitment of the U.S. in the region 
(Perlez 2013; Demick 2013).
Vietnam
A  similar deepening of mutual cooperation, unofficially aimed at 
mitigating the Chinese influence in the region, can be observed between 
the United States and Vietnam. In this case, however, it is not a recent 
occurrence. The Vietnamese policymakers have sought out the American 
engagement as a balancing power already in2007 when the SCS dispute, 
which is believed to be the most significant obstacle for developing positive 
Sino-Vietnamese relations (Le 2013), was again aggravated. What Hanoi 
wanted from the United States at first was not a balancing engagement as 
such, but rather a form of diplomatic support; that is, stressing the neces-
sity of adhering to the idea of freedom of navigation, as well as sticking to 
the agreed common principles (Manyin 2013, 8). With the course of time, 
however, the American presence in the region and the security coopera-
tion developing between these two countries seem to set Vietnam to an 
even more confrontational policy. Hanoi, unwilling to back down from its 
exploitation of natural resources in the disputed areas, perceives its deep-
ening ties with the United States as a means of strengthening their stance 
against Beijing, and thus as the most important balancing power (Glaser 
2012). The Memorandum of Understanding on Advancing Bilateral De-
fence Cooperation of2011, which is being implemented by both countries, 
serves this purpose and is positively assessed by the participating parties 
(The White House 2013). A crucial impact of the Memorandum is the es-
tablishment of a functional framework for consultation, the exchange of 
experiences and meetings of high-ranking officials. Since 2011, Vietnam 
has been visited by the Commanders of the 7th Fleet and the Pacific Fleet 
(2012), hosted naval trainings (2012 and 2013) and hosted the 3rd De-
fence Policy Dialogue (2013). Moreover, the exchange of experiences took 
place on both the official and academic level. For example, in June 2013 
Vietnamese Minister of Defence and Chief of Staff, General Do Ba Ty, 
visited the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff; and in 2011 and 2012 delegations of 
defence academy students visited the United States and Vietnam respec-
tively (Thayer 2013).
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While it could be beneficial for all interested parties to handle the SCS 
dispute multilaterally, China is reluctant to this solution. It has also proved 
unsuccessful, since even though ASEAN managed to contain the dispute, 
it appears unable to shape a  united stance, let alone solve the  dispute 
(Thayer 2012, Storey 2011). Hence, in the face of disheartening results of 
a hedging policy, Vietnam is even more interested in tightening its secu-
rity ties with the United States in order to balance China. As expressed 
during the visit of Vietnamese President Sang to Washington in July 2013, 
the long-term goal of Vietnam in its relations with the United States is to 
build a strong strategic partnership (BBC News 2013).
An important step in deepening the military cooperation between Ha-
noi and Washington, which is also a means to counterbalance the Chi-
nese influence in the region, is the possibility of wider usage of the naval 
base in Cam Ranh Bay by the U.S. Navy; currently, only non-combat U.S. 
ships can be maintained there. The Defence Secretary Leon Panetta ex-
pressed eagerness during his visit in June 2012 to develop cooperation in 
maritime issues in this direction (Ratnam 2012). The promises of assis-
tance made by Panetta in implementing a code of conduct in the SCS area 
have been enhanced by the Secretary of State John Kerry. During his visit 
to Vietnam in December 2013 he announced that the United States will 
dedicate 32.5 million dollars to “maritime law enforcement in Southeast 
Asian states”, of which approximately 18 million is dedicated to Vietnam. 
Even though Kerry stressed that his declaration is not related to the re-
gional tensions, it remains a clear example of counterbalancing Chinese 
influence in the SCS (Tiezzi 2013).
Thus, even in the light of gradual improvements in Sino-Vietnamese 
relations, Beijing is still perceived as a challenge that needs to be mitigated 
by a closer alliance with the United States. However, as presented above, 
in the case of Vietnam it is not a recent shift in policy, rather a result of 
the long-term security interests of Hanoi in the SCS area.
Malaysia
Even for the countries that due to their history of good relations with 
China in general, and particularly their recent beneficial economic ties 
with Beijing, are more prone to use hedging instead of balancing, there are 
reasons beckoning them to shift their stance. For Malaysia, economically 
more developed as it is than some other Southeast Asian countries and 
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enjoying long-term positive relations with China, the  security stability 
in the region remains its key interest, being the sine qua non for further 
growth and for successful regional integration. Hence, the  strengthen-
ing assertiveness of China in maritime areas and the resulting tensions, 
whichare perceived to have an armed conflict potential, motivate Kuala 
Lumpur to implement more balancing to its policies.
Even though rapprochement with the United States is not as evident 
as in the case of Indonesia, the American strategy of “pivot movement” 
to Southeast Asia, as announced by Hillary Clinton (2011), has enjoyed 
a positive response in Malaysia. Even if it still prefers the policy of en-
gaging China into a multilateral network, which is a typical example of 
the  hedging policy, the  presence of the  United States in the  Southeast 
Asian area is perceived as a  balancer, also in terms of military securi-
ty in the SCS (Hamilton-Hart 2012, 337). The Malaysian policymakers 
though are acutely aware that the  regional stability cannot be achieved 
simply by allowing a greater presence of the U.S. military in the region to 
balance the growing numbers of the People’s Liberation Army; on the con-
trary, they fully understand the risk of antagonising China and the United 
States further by doing so. Thus, their balancing actions are more limited 
by the necessity of sustaining the fragile equilibrium of power (Tang 2012, 
23–26). An example of this could be the calm reception of the Chinese na-
val exercises conduced in March 2013 near the coast of Malaysia. There 
has been no official comment or protest about that event by the Malay-
sian government, which can be read as a demonstration of “quiet diploma-
cy” towards Beijing, executed in order to prevent straining their mutual 
relations. SharimanLockman argues that this policy allows Kuala Lumpur 
to enjoy a relatively higher level of safety in the SCS area (in comparison 
to the Philippines and Vietnam), which could not be afforded by engaging 
the United States to greater extent (Shariman 2013).
Therefore, what is interesting in the Malaysian form of balancing is 
its indirectness and low intensity. While some actions of the government 
in Kuala Lumpur could be understood as balancing against China, for 
example the  full-fledged participation in the  Cobra Gold U.S. military 
exercise, they are never clearly aimed against Beijing. Contrary to the ex-
amples given when considering Indonesia and Vietnam, in the  case of 
Malaysia it is not the diplomatic but the military-to-military ties that are 
becoming the core of the security cooperation, and they are not limited 
to the immediate region. During his visit to Kuala Lumpur in 2012, Leon 
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Panetta expressed his thanks for the medical personnel of the Malaysian 
Armed Forces for their commitment in Afghanistan (New Strait Times 
2012), and the SCS dispute and its implications were not emphasised. 
The Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel, when meeting with the Malaysian 
Minister of Defence Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein in Kuala 
Lumpur 2013, also stressed the  importance of the  regular exchange of 
military representatives and joint military exercises as a means of build-
ing the  bilateral relationship (Pellerin 2013). As Kuik (2013) observes, 
there is no clear link between the deepening ties with the United States 
and the rising Chinese potential, as can be seen in the case of Vietnam for 
example. The issue of the SCS dispute is approached indirectly. A good 
example of this indirectness is the first visit of Minister Hishammuddin 
to the United States in January 2014. The Minister addressed the issue as 
“actions taken by certain countries which could create regional instabili-
ty” during his meeting with the Deputy Secretary of State, and not with 
the Secretary of Defence (The Malay Mail 2014). Thus, if Malaysia engag-
es in a balancing policy, it can be described as indirect balancing, and as 
such can be perceived as a more restricted form of a hedging policy rather 
than a ‘pure’ balancing strategy.
As the three examples of Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam illustrate, 
even the same idea of soft balancing is interpreted differently in each ASE-
AN member state, in accordance with its particular interests. It serves 
as another proof for the complexity of the Sino-ASEAN relations and its 
close dependence on the recent interests of particular states. To determine 
the foreign policy pattern of the Association as a whole, however, further 
studies are necessary in order to determine not only the precise interests 
of each member country, but their influence within ASEAN as well.
Conclusion
An important question that arises after the  presented analysis is 
whether describing the policies of the ASEAN member countries as (soft) 
balancing is not an exaggeration. It could be argued as well that the given 
country has positive and beneficial relations with China in at least one 
sphere, and rarely are there cases of open enmity between the ASEAN 
member countries and Beijing. Finally, the policy of soft balancing could 
be associated with strong alliances with another country leading to con-
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flict. Thus, it could be claimed that, all in all, the policy of the ASEAN 
member countries, and therefore of the whole Association as well, takes 
the form of hedging.
This reasoning is helpful by emphasising the complexity in regards 
to the  interests of the  ASEAN member countries towards China and 
by showing that, apart from security and trade, there are other factors cru-
cial in forming foreign policy. Furthermore, hedging, as described by Kuik, 
encompasses a  spectrum of policies varying from indirect balancing to 
limited bandwagoning, and hence it can become a label for various polit-
ical activities (Kuik 2013). However, in accordance with the thesis stated 
at the  beginning of this article, it is not the  long-term strategy which 
should be searched for and examined. The focus should be rather drawn 
to the recent empirical activities of the ASEAN member countries and, as 
described above, they seem to be prone to adapting more soft balancing to 
their strategies, due to the recently tightening stance of China. Of course, 
the internal pushing and pulling factors are not the only features influenc-
ing the shape of the policy towards China, a key problem, not discussed 
within this article, is the Chinese attitude towards the Association and its 
spectrum of political instruments used to prevent ASEAN from forming 
a united stance. Beijing must be cautious though not to provoke the fear 
of ‘the Chinese threat’, which could justify the policy of soft balancing in 
the eyes of the public opinion. The external factors shaping the foreign 
policy of ASEAN towards China have been, however, the subject of inter-
esting studies (Ba 2008).
While the  topic of the  process of forming the  ASEAN attitude to-
wards China has not been fully examined yet, the closer look on this issue 
proves that the foreign policy of ASEAN is flexible and changeable over 
the course of time due to the changes in individual interests and recep-
tions of the Chinese presence of the particular member states. Thus, for 
predicting the future trends in the Sino-ASEAN relation, a close study of 
the internal interests should be treated as the base point for any further 
analysis.
References
Ba, A. D. (2008). “Between China and America: ASEAN’s great power dilemmas”. In 
China, the United States, and South-East Asia Contending Perspectives on Politics, 
Security, and Economics, edited by Sheldon W. Simon, Evelyn Goh, 107–127. London 
and New York: Routledge.
Joanna Dobkowska252
Barbieri, K., Keshk, Omar, Pollins, Brian. (2009). “Trading data: evaluating our assump-
tions and coding rules”. Conflict Management and Peace Science: 26: 21.
Bodirsky, D. (2012). “US-Indonesian Relations: A Balancing Act – Analysis”. Eurasia Re-
view, URL: http://www.eurasiareview.com/11062012-us-indonesian-relations-a-bal-
ancing-act-analysis/ (accessed August 29, 2013).
Bush, R. (2011). “As Host, Indonesia Anticipates Obama’s First East Asia Summit”, 
The Asia Foundation. URL: http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2011/11/16/as-host-in-
donesia-anticipates-obamas-first-east-asia-summit/ (accessed January 25, 2014).
Chen, Ian Tsung-Yen, Yang, A. (2013). “A harmonized Southeast Asia? Explanatory typol-
ogies of ASEAN countries’ strategies to the rise of China”. The Pacific Review, 26: 
265–288.
Clinton, Hillary. (2011). “America’s Pacific Century”. The  Foreign Policy, URL: http://
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century (accessed Sep-
tember 2, 2013).
Ginting, A. (2011). “The Impacts ofACFTAto Indonesia – China Trade”. ICRA Indone-
sia Comment. URL: http://icraindonesia.com/uploaded/The%20Impacts%20of%20
ACFTA%20020511.pdf. (accessed September 5, 2013)
Glaser, B. S. (2012). “Armed Clash in the South China Sea”. Contingency Planning Mem-
orandum No. 14, Council on Foreign Relations Press.
Goh, E. (2005). “Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Se-
curity Strategies”. Policy Studies No. 16. Washington: East-West Center Washington.
Goh, E. (2007). “Southeast Asian perspectives on the China challenge”. Journal of Strate-
gic Studies, 30: 89–832. URL: doi: 10.1080/01402390701431915 (accessed Septem-
ber 2, 2013).
Gradziuk, A. (2010). “Implications of ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA)”. 
Bulletin of the Polish Institute of Foreign Affairs, 84: 164–165.
Hamilton-Hart, N. (2012). “Southeast Asian perceptions of the American power”. In Rou-
tledge handbook of Southeast Asian politics, edited by Richard Robison, 338–345, 
London and New York: Routledge.
Hiebert, M., Magpile, J. (2012). “Comprehensive Partnership Nudges U.S.-Indonesia Re-
lations to New Levels of Cooperation”. Center for Strategic & International Studies. 
URL: http://csis.org/publication/comprehensive-partnership-nudges-us-indonesia-re-
lations-new-levels-cooperation (accessed September 3, 2013).
Hiebert, M.; Osius, T. and Poling, G. B. (2013). A U.S.- Indonesia Partnership for 2020 
Recommendations for Forging a 21st Century Relationship, 9, Lanham and Washing-
ton: Rowman& Littlefield.
Hsiao, M., Yang, Alan. 2008. “Transformations of China’s soft power toward ASEAN”. 
China Brief 22: 11–15.
Jackson, R., Sørensen, G. (2003). “Introduction to International Relation”. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Khong, Yuen Foong. (2004). “Coping with Strategic Uncertainty: The Role of Institutions 
and Soft Balancing in Southeast Asia’s Post-Cold War Strategy”. In Rethinking Secu-
rity in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency, edited by J. J. Suh, Peter J. Katzen-
stein, and Allen Carlson. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Kuik, Cheng-Chwee. (2008). “The  Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Re-
sponse to a Rising China”. Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International 
and Strategic Affairs, 30: 159–185. URL: doi: 10.1353/csa.0.0023 (accessed August 
28, 2013).
253 Hedging China? The Meaning of the ASEAN Member States’ Interests…
Kuik, Cheng-Chwee. 2013. “Making Sense of Malaysia’s China Policy: Asymmetry, Prox-
imity, and Elite’s Domestic Authority”. Chinese Journal of International Politics. 
URL: doi: 10.1093/cjip/pot006 (accessed September 5, 2013).
Le, Hong Hiep. (2013). “South China Sea disputes strain Vietnam–China relations”. East 
Asia Forum. URL: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/05/17/south-china-sea-dis-
putes-strain-vietnam-china-relations/. (accessed August 31, 2013).
Lee, Jeongseok. (2012). “Hedging against Uncertain Future: The Response of East Asian 
Secondary Powers to Rising China”. Paper presented at the International Political Sci-
ence Association XXII World Congress of Political Science, Madrid, Spain, July 8–12.
Manyin, M. E. “U.S.-Vietnam Relations in 2013: Current Issues and Implications for U.S. 
Policy”. CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service. URL: http://www.
fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40208.pdf (accessed August 29, 2013).
Mearsheimer, J. (2001). “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”. New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company.
Murphy, A. M. (2013). “Indonesia in Asia’s Changing Balance of Power”. World Politics 
Review. URL: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12779/indonesia-in-asia-
s-changing-balance-of-power (accessed September 2, 2013).
Ng, Beoy Kui. (2007). “The Economic Rise of China: Its Threats and Opportunities from 
the Perspective of Southeast Asia”. The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies, 25: 
9–27.
Pellerin, Ch. 2013. “Hagel Underscores Commitment to Partnership With Malaysia”, 
US Department of Defence. URL: http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx-
?id=120670 (accessed January 29, 2014).
Perlez, J. (2013). “Cancellation of Trip by Obama Plays to Doubts of Asia Allies”, The New 
York Times. URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/05/world/asia/with-obama-
stuck-in-washington-china-leader-has-clear-path-at-asia-conferences.html (accessed 
January 25, 2014).
Pimoljinda, Thanawat. (2013). “Ethno-Cultural Diversity: A  Challenging Parameter 
for ASEAN Regional Integration”. Public Administration in The Time of Regional 
Change Conference Papers, 61–65.
Ravenhill, J. (2006). “Is China an economic threat to Southeast Asia?” Asian Survey, 46: 
653–674.
Roy, D. (2005). “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 27: 305–322. URL: 
doi: 10.1353/csa.2011.0115. (accessed September 5, 2013).
Severino, R. (2009). The ASEAN Regional Forum, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies.
Shariman, L. (2013). “Why Malaysia isn’t afraid of China (for now)”, The Strategist. URL: 
http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-malaysia-isnt-afraid-of-china-for-now/. (ac-
cessed January 29, 2014).
Storey, Ian. (2013). “Slipping Away? A South China Sea Code of Conduct Eludes Diplo-
matic Efforts”. East and South China Seas Bulletin No. 11, Center for New American 
Security. URL: http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Bulletin_
Storey_Slipping_Away_0.pdf (accessed September 1, 2013).
Tang, Siew Mun. (2013). “Malaysia’s Perspectives and Responses to Strategic Challenges”. 
Security Outlook of the Asia Pacific Countries and Its Implications for the Defense 
Sector, 7: 21–30. Tokyo: The National Institute of Defence Studies.
Thayer, Carlyle A. (2012). “ASEAN’s Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A Litmus 
Test for Community-Building?” The Asia-Pacific Journal, vol. 10, issue 34, No. 4.
Joanna Dobkowska254
Tjhin, Christine Susanna. (2012). “Indonesia’s Relation with China: Productive and Prag-
matic, but not yet a Strategic Partnership”. China Report, 48: 303–315. URL: doi: 
10.1177/0009445512462303 (accessed September 1, 2013).
Waltz, K. N. (2001). “Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis”. New York: Co-
lumbia University Press.
Zhong, Wu. (2010). “A daring departure from Deng”. Asia Times Online, URL: http://www.
atimes.com/atimes/China/LH06Ad02.html (accessed August 30, 2013).
